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INDEPENDENCE OF LOCAL FINANCE 
By Dr. Masao Kambe 
FOREWORD 
In present-day Japan, strengthening of the independence of local finance 
constitutes one of the knottiest problems requiring solution. If local com-
munity remains just a local administrative district and not a self-governing 
body, there will be no question of debating about the independence of local 
finance. So long, however, as local community enjoys the status of a public 
judicial person and is given the right of a self-governing body, it naturally 
follows that its finance be endowed with independence, and, further, not 
being satisfied with this, measure for its strengthening should also be taken 
into consideration. Especially, the recent trends in Japan of local finance 
suffering from deficit have come to bring to the fore various problems in 
sequence. In order to eliminate such deficit, for one thing, again, streng-
thening of local finance will be given an added importance. That the 
present writer has taken up this question in particular, at this juncture, is 
for the purpose of presenting certain material data intended for its solution. 
* The author is emeritus professor at Kyoto University 
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(1) Importance of the Independence of Local Finance 
In Japan it should be conceded that whether it is advisable to have 
local self-government still furthered or to have it relegated, on the contrary, 
to a mere status of local administrative district subject to a powerful central 
government, poses a major problem requiring serious consideration. Im-
mediately following the end of the Second World War, the entire Japanese 
territory was placed under occupation by the American armed forces. Under 
American guidance, it was established that local self-governing system should 
be fostered and strengthened. This policy resulted not directly from the 
initiative of the Japanese people themselves, but from the general line of 
policy pursued by the American occupation authorities in the early stage 
of the occupation, aiming, among other things, at weakening Japan as a 
nation. To be more explicit, it is remembered that in past years Japan 
always had a strong tendency toward a powerful centralization and a national 
unity ensured upon this foundation. This obviously failed to please the 
Americans, who taxed their brains to divide and disintegrate Japan. One 
method they hit upon, for the fulfilment of this objective, was found in 
measures for the strengthened local self governing setup. They chose this, 
confident that such will be beneficial not only to the Japanese but also to 
the Americans. That the occupation authorities, in the latter years of the 
occupation, gradually came to effect a change in their policy should espe-
cially be mentioned here: Japan was to become a member of the com-
munity of the free nations, and in her capacity as an active collaborator 
with the camp, should once more become a strong nation. There are 
indications that, from this time one, their effort was slackened in relation to 
the avowed expansion and strengthening of local self-governing machinery 
in Japan. In any case, now that Japan is liberated from their occupation 
and has regained her independence. Japan should exercise her own initiative, 
no matter what American intentions once were or whether their intentions 
underwent a modification or not, regarding their course to proceed along 
in future, in which the freely-expressed opinion of the Japanese people should 
have its voice. It should, thus, be entirely. up to the Japanese people to 
adjust if the present shape of local self-government is actually improperly 
radical or if it is sufficiently adequate and proper as it is. In the former 
case, measures may be taken to right the wrong, and, in the latter, it will 
be allowed to remain in its present shape. And if, again, it is found to be 
in need of further strengthening, steps may, of course, be adopted in such 
direction. In my opinion, the local self-governing structure which was fos-
tered under American advice and assistance, regardless of what ulterior 
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intention they acted from, had better be allowed to retain its present status. 
Spectacular progress in this particular field has attained the stage as it is 
in evidence now. Likewise it should be considered unnecessary and unwise 
to have the democratic way of politics checked at the present stage. Of 
course, it may be conceded that some quarters even now envisage to have 
democratic pattern of politics brought back to the old Imperialism. The 
general trend of public opinion in the country at present moment, however, 
is evidently in favor of the retention of democracy as it is now acceptable. 
So far as the democratic politics is to be retained, it should be considered 
that local s'elf-governing structure had better be maintained and strengthened 
even just for the purpose of retaining in its present form the democratic 
way of politics. Under the defunct Constitution, local autonomy in Japan 
had witnessed progress, though to a limited extent. It must be conceded, 
however, that Japan, as far as this particular aspect is concerned, was 
considerably behind such Western democracies as America and Britain. 
Tendency toward centralization was so manifest and powerful in the coun-
try. In other words,' local autonomy had not yet had its roots planted 
deep in the ground. The roots have only recently begun to be planted, 
and it would be a matter for regret, indeed, to see the self-governing system 
retard in its progress to any extent. Our desire, thus, is on the contrary, 
to try to retain it in its present stage of progress, and, further, to have it 
strengthened for the ultimate aim of fostering Japan as a true democratic 
nation with a commendable working system of local autonomy. If it is 
agreed that local autonomy should be retained in its present form, or, 
rather, be strengthened further, it should go without saying that local 
finance, as a factor to support it, be so strengthoned that its independence 
be further promoted. If on the contrary, local community is financially 
dependent upon the state with its independence weakened to the extent of 
such dependence, both selfgovernment and autonomous independence of local 
politics would be in name only. So long as local finance is equipped with 
an inadequate independence and has to look for state aid, chances would 
inevitably be multiplied for interference by the state, the result being that 
local autonomy degenerates into a painted bread. 
(2) Limitations on Independence of Local Finahce 
That the proper fostering of a local self-government system is necessary 
as a prerequisite to the proper growth of democratic politics, and that the 
independence of local finance is of paramount necessity for the perfection 
of local self-governing system, have been fully enunciated in the fore going 
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lines. It is most desirable that local finance is disposed of according to the 
free will of the individual local community, that annual expenditures be 
determined freely according to its will, and that the source of its revenue 
be decided individually according to the conditions prevailing in each par-
ticular community, entirely independent of central directions nor dependent 
upon its help. It must be conceded, however, that the avowed independence 
of local finance is originally imbued with an inherent contradiction that a 
full-fledged and absolute independence of local finance is something which 
can only be hoped for but can never be realized. This brings us face to 
face with two phases of limitations inherent therein. 
A) Legal Limitations 
In the first place, local finance is subject to the state-stipulated laws. 
As far as this is concerned, there can be no question of a perfect indepen-
dence. While having an independent personality and will, local community 
cannot extricate itself from the predestined premise that it stands within the 
state and under its will. 1m possible is it that it disengages itself from the 
central control exercised by the state. Befere the needs of the state as a 
whole, it will have to bow; it will have to act in such a way that national 
interest be promoted and national loss averted. Part of administrative mat-
ters as well as finance conducted by the state may be commissioned to local 
governments to the extent that such is considered advisable in the light of 
national interest. If the state stipulates it by laws, the only recourse permit-
ted to local government is just to act accordingly. This will naturally entail 
payment to the local government of financial subsidy and aid by the state 
to cover the expense involved. This, in other words, is to affirm that the 
independence of local finance is impaired to that extent. Even in handling 
such administrative matters as are considered peculiar to a local community, 
the permissible scope of such handling will have to be dictated by state 
laws. Especially with regard to some phases of such affairs, their proper 
handling, as a matter of fact, is imposed upon the local government in 
question by the state as an obligation. Excepting this particular phase, the 
remainder only will thus be left to be handled under its own judgement 
and capability,-this is, the only perceivable phase where the independence 
of local finance may be retained in an unimpaired form. Even when a 
local community intends to issue public bonds for the purpose of covering 
its financial deficit or of starting a new enterprise, the state will be asked 
to exercise controls and limitation on the precise purposes, amount and 
methods of issuing such bonds inasmuch as uncontrolled freedom of a local 
government in this respect will be liable to pose a hindrance to the state in 
the way of its intentions to issue national bonds and of conducting smoothly 
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its industrial and financial policy. Before the requirements of the state, thus, 
the local goverment has simply to give up its place. The same applies to 
taxation: if a local government is left free to make decision about the various 
categories of taxes, methods of levying them and their amount, such will 
be liable to trespass upon the fundamental right of the state with regard to 
taxation. Thus, the state is required to stipulate a set of local tax laws, 
according to which a local government will be allowed to collect taxes. In 
this case, again, proper limitations are unavoidable with regard to the cate-
gories and amount of taxes to be collected as well as the method of col-
lecting them, the main objectives being that the national interest may not 
be impaired. This amply shows that the so-called independence of local 
finance is never absolute, in nature but is relative, conditional and restrictive. 
Subordinate, though, to these limitations imposed by the state, a local self-
governing body still has an ample room left to maintain the independence 
of its finance through a full operation of its capability and through its indi-
vidual invention and devices and without national help. How far it can 
exercise its financial autonomy, however, is largely dependent upon the dif-
ference of conditions among each of specific local communities. Thus, it 
is seen that the alleged independence of local finance is subject to various 
controls exercised by the state, in the same way as an individual, while 
enjoying an independent personality as an autonomous individual, is still 
predestined to confine his existence with its state and, as such, is required 
to respect national interest and act in such a way that the latter may not 
be impaired. The local community, thus, stands under the state and is 
given a restricted independence, while the latter directs the former and rest-
ricts the scope of freedom it may be allowed to act in. It must not be 
forgotten, however, that the proper functions of the state in this respect are 
not just to restrict, but aid, at the same time. In case of a local community 
so weak financially, being unable to attend even to ordinary administrative 
matters, the state will be disposed to make a state subsidy available with 
which to overcome such difficulties. Proper vigilance, however, will have 
to be exercised lest some local self-governing organization, taking advantage 
of such a system, should indulge in back-of-the-scene maneuverings with the 
aim of securing such state subsidies to an amount far exceeding actual 
needs, to the detriment of the interests of not only the state but also of 
other organizations ranking on the same level. Such sinister tendencies will 
be liable to be noticed even among some of the financially-stable com-
munities as well as others lacking proper and adequate financial backing. 
Such will inevitably result in an impairment of the interests of the state and 
other similarly-situated organizations as well. This, furthermore, will amount 
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to a disgrace on the part of such community in question; it will be an 
infringement upon the local self-governing and autonomous system. It goes 
without saying, thus, that every local community, under limitations duly 
exercised by state laws, should exert its own endeavours to the utmost pos-
sible, resort to every means and recourses available in order that its required 
expenses be covered locally. Pride should 'be found in the fact that no 
state aid is rendered necessary and, even in case such is unavoidable, that 
the amount asked for be kept at the lowest level possible. And here should 
the independence of local finance find its proper starting point. 
B) De Facto Limitations 
While the limitations as referred to in the preceding lines may be 
experienced by every and all local communities, those mentioned herein may 
occur only in some. To be more precise, these will be experienced by such 
local community which is financially weak, where this very fact poses limita-
tion on its financial independence. In case of a local organization which 
is more or less well-off, establishment of any number of categories of local 
taxes and determination of the amount will be possible with a comparative 
case despite various limitations and controls duly imposed by state laws, 
and thus, amply cover expenses required locally. If it is deemed necessary 
to issue new local bonds, it will be under no difficulty in meeting such need, 
notwithstanding legal limitations, because it enjoys a sufficient credit to 
finance it. In case of a financiallyweak community, on the contrary, the 
situation is entirely different. Under the limitations imposed by laws, it 
will be unable to raise a revenue required for attending to all necessary 
administrative affairs. Lack of adequate credit will stand in the way of its 
effort to raise public bonds, because the market will tum a deaf ear to its 
appeals. Here the state will be required to intervene to help it; recourse, 
in most cases, will be made to the local lease taxes and subsidiary taxes, 
with which to cover up its financial deficit. In some cases, the state will 
forward the political funds to back up its attempt to raise local bonds. If 
the matter comes up to this, there will be no question of the independence 
of local finance, and instead, there will remain a total dependence upon the 
state. Thus, it will be seen that the very weakness, financially, of a local 
community at once constitutes a limitation on the hopedfor independence 
of its finance. Again, this is a case where a local community, with ample 
economic background, under normal conditions, may, in the face of a natu-
ral disaster, or in sudden economic recession, find itself powerless to finance 
its own expenses or, consequently, look to the state for emergency assistance. 
Accompanied with all these limitations, the avowed independence of local 
finance can never be perfect. It should be hoped, however, that, even under 
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such limitations, the financial independence of local self-governing orgalllza-
tion be given as full a playas possible. 
(3) Local Autonomy in Expenses 
Among the expenditures relative to a local community, there are a 
number of items which it is not in a position to decide on unilaterally. 
Such items, tending to run counter to the principle of local autonomy, usually 
amount to a considerable number. As such may be cited those which, 
under the stipulations of relevant laws, a local community or its subor-
dinate organizations are obliged to attend to; others, which, similarly under 
the stipulations of relevant laws, a local community or its subordinate 
organizations are asked to perform under the commission by either the state 
or a prefecture; still, others, again under the stipulations of relevant laws, 
a local community or its subordinate organizations are directed by either 
the state or a prefecture for their proper disposition and also, those, which 
according to the prefectural statutes, are either dictated or commissioned 
to a local community or its subordinate organizations for proper disposal. 
The expenses involved therein may, as a whole, be labelled obligatory 
expenditures. Regarding these particular items, a local community will have 
no autonomy. In spite of this, however, it may be too much to say that 
the entire range of such expenses is divorced from their independence. 
Disposition of similar business, dependent upon the special devices on the 
part of the local officials attending, may not involve such amount of ex-
penses as would otherwise be required, and herein will be found room for 
a play, to a certain extent, allowed to the alleged independence of local 
finance. This is to say, in other words, that some of the local authorities 
in charge of these matters are required to rectify their attitude relative 
to their disposition. Now, such obligatory expenditures, as a matter of 
fact, occupy a comparatively high percentage in the total budget of a local 
community. To cite an example: according to the publication entitled 
"Finance of Cities and Towns in the Environs of the City of Osaka",' a 
certain suburban city, which, in the fiscal year 1952 did not find it neces-
sary to have the counter-poise subsidy paid by the state, had to expend as 
much as 79.2 % of its total budgetary expenditures as such obligatory 
expenditures. The high percentage required for this particular item of 
expenditures is liable to induce some of local government authorities to shift 
the responsibility for inviting a deficit in their finance to this particular 
circumstance. This attitude, of course, deserves criticism, for, the same 
category and amount of adminstrative basis may not necessarily. demand 
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the expenditure of the same amount of expenses according to what attitude 
the officials in charge actually adopt. 
(4) Local Autonomy in Taxes 
1) General 
Taxes play an important role in the local revenue in augmenting local 
autonomy. In some local community, its financial stituation is so sound and 
its tax revenue so adequate that it, even under various legal constraints, may 
be enabled to discharge not only such matters as are obligatory but also 
those which are intended purely for the benefit of the local population 
without recourse to state aid and free from state';ntervention. Here, limita-
tions usually imposed on local autonomy .will remain just nominal and 
immaterial. Again, an ample revenue accruing from a specific property 
peculiar to a local community will be bound to play a highly significant 
role in expanding the local autonomy. While if a local community is in 
a position to finance its administrative needs with a local tax revenue, it 
will not be in need of financial aid from the state, such will, at the same, 
be bound to stimulate implementation of the local politics in that it automa-
tically shoulders due responsibility in its relation to the component members 
of the community. Because of the existence of such tax, it will be subject 
to criticisms from the component members with regard to the propriety, 
amount and the method of levying and further, the balance, if ever, between 
the volume of administrative matters involved and the amount of the tax 
collected. This will, as a matter of fact, render it out of question to shift 
the responsibility for any dissatisfaction over to the imperfection and inade-
quacy of the state-stipulated institutions. Comparison will, of course, be 
made with other local communities working under the same taxation 
structure. If it is found that the tax levied is unduely heavy in the 
light of administrative matters, and enterprises actually carrier out, 
complaints from its component members will be found to come up one 
after another, eventually forcing the officials of the community to seriously 
reflect upon their conducts. The existence of the tax, thus, will make the 
responsibility on the part of local community distinct and unequivocal, which, 
in other words, will mean that [these officials, in their turn, will, by the 
force of the circumstances, become really serious-minded in the conduct of 
their official duties. 
2) Independence in Special Taxes 
Now taxes carry a difference to the extent to which they speciffcally 
are independent. 
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A) Independent Taxes 
There is no question that the independent taxes are imbued with the 
more pronounced autonomy than any other taxes. Among these will be 
cited the Fixed Property Tax which, of all local taxes presently in force in 
Japan, levied by local cities, towns and villages, brings a considerably big 
revenue with a high degree of independence. This is a tax imposed and 
levied by cities, towns and villages through their own organs, where there 
is no room for the state to intervene. Herein local autonomy is most une-
quivocally expressed. Although it is theoretically subject to the overall 
taxation system stipulated by the state, it does have no recoUl'se to the state 
with regard to its imposition and levying. No aid from the state is required 
here. The local administration, in its own force, fixes the applicable crite-
rion with respect to property selected for levying, according to which a 
fixed amount is levied through its own organs. Next comes the Tobacco 
Consumption Tax, newly established, as falling in this category (it must be 
conceded, however, that this may well be interpreted as a surtax to be added 
to the state's tobacco monopoly revenue). 
B) Semi-Independent Taxes 
To be labelled as semi-independent are Local Residence Tax and En-
terprise Tax, for these, while independent in some respect, are somewhat 
dependent upon the state, and, because, to the extent that they are depen-
dent thereon, their intrinsic autonomy is detracted. These taxes, of course, 
are levied at the hand of local communities, including prefectural government, 
through their own organs, against taxable objects. However, in determining 
the criterion thereof, that fixed by the state is utilized, and, in this respect, 
it unavoidably entails a feature making it a semblance of a surtax to the 
state tax. To be more precise, levying of local residence tax is enforced on 
the basic critericn of the taxable income, as stipulated by the state, with 
regard to Income and Corporate Taxes, while, the enterprise tax, imposed 
by the prefectural Government, makes use of data prepared by the state 
relative to these two state taxes in actual levying. 
C) Surtax 
Formerly there was in existence a surtax to the state tax, imposed by 
a locol community, which has now cessed to exist. Such, in substance, was 
a category entirely dependent upon the central Government, materially 
detrimental to the autonomy of local taxation. It is a fact, however, that, 
even in levying such surtax, there was an upper limit fixed, with in the 
framework of which a local community would be allowed a margin for 
freedom of decision. This, it would de safe to say, amounts to an autonomy. 
Compared with such as subsidiary tax and lease tax, which are one-han-
10 M. KAMBE 
dedly handed to the local community by the state within a certain amount 
fixed by the latter, the surtax as mentioned above had actually an advantage 
of enjoying more freedom. The prefectural residence tax, newly inaugurated, 
amounts, as a matter of fact, to a surtax to the local r:::sidence tax. It 
does not signify that the prefectural Government relies on the state on. this 
account; it does, on the contrary, mean that it thereby evinces its depen-
dence on the local community, being deprived of its own autonomy to that 
extent. 
D) The Lease Taxes 
Under this category come such taxes, like the admittance tax and 
gasoline tax, a certain percentage of the revenue accruing from which (90 % 
or 1/3) is leased to the local government on the basis of a fixed standard of 
the financial requirements of prefectures as well as Hokkaido and the Tokyo 
Metropolis. The standard as referred to above is usually on th;) basis of 
the population or road area in the district in question. Seen from the 
beneficiary local community, such taxes should constitute one of the entire 
range of independent tax revenue upon which it may rely financially. Ho-
wever, the fact remains that they are not such taxes which are locally levied 
and collected but are simply leased by the state, which actually levy them. 
In this sense, they are never independent taxes with which the state has 
nothing to do. The lease of these taxes are carried out to all local govern-
ments, irrespective of whether the local recipient in question is financially 
well-off or not. This inevitably leads to the general tendency that the 
beneficiaries in dispersing the funds thus leased, are inclined to be lenient-
minded even to the extent that the money is -lavishly expended. On the 
other hand, a local community which normally is financially destitute, us-
ually finds such funds more abundant than those levied in its own admini-
strative area, because they flow in from such areas which are administered 
by community other than its own. This naturally tends to deprive the 
local officials in charge of the sense of responsibility in connection with 
expenditures from this funds in proportion as their reliance adds to its extent. 
E) Subsidiary Taxes 
This category includes such taxes, which, constituting part of state taxes, 
like the income tax, corporation tax and beverage tax, are particularly 
handed over to such local governments which are in need of outside help 
in order to administer such administrative affairs as are to be administered 
by every local community. Thus, this may, also, in a sense, be viewed, 
according to the provision of the law, to be liable to be incorporated into 
its system of revenue upon which it may rely. Particularly, the difference 
between the basic financial revenue and the basic financial requirements 
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should be expected, as far as a financially-deficit local community is con-
cerned, to constitute its own legitimate revenue. However, it must be noted 
that it is up to this appraisal by the state with regard to such subsidiary 
taxes as may be adjudged too small in amount. Further, occasion arises 
only too frequently that difference of opinion occurs between the state and 
the local community in question regarding the commutation of the amount 
of the basic difference. Room for negotiations exists here, and it may be 
only to natural for the local community to desire to solicit as much amonnt 
as feasible from the state, and should, on this account, resort to a vigorous 
" campaign of petitions". The fixed ratio among the three taxes, as refer-
red to above, may subsequently be liable to be altered, as they are subject 
to the financial capability of the state. Revision of the ratio may, again, 
entail a series of petitionary campaigning. Viewed in this light, they may 
hardly be labelled as independent revenue sources in a true sense of the 
term; on the contrary, they may even be considered to be less independent 
than the lease taxes mentioned in the previous paragraph. Further, inasmuch 
as this, in particular, is given to financially-deficit communities and not to 
all local governments, this may, in a sense, be called a sort of subsidy. 
It would, thus, be more appropriately called a dependent source of revenue 
rather than an independent one. The fact is that, here there is room for 
negotiation between the state and the specific local community with regard 
to the commutation of the difference accruing between the basic revenue 
and basic financial requirements, with the unavoidable consequence that in 
case the state decides on an amount, which the community in question 
considers unduly small, the latter may launch npon a series of vigorous 
movements of petition with an aim to influencing the former so that it may 
be inclined to become more generous-minded. 
(5) Local Autonomy in Subsidies 
There is no need. to reiterate that the subsidies as a matter of fact 
deprive the local government of its independence. The state intervenes to 
make decisions about the administrative matters and enterprises undertaken 
by the local community, which constitute the objectives for which such 
subsidies are granted, as well as about their amount. This naturally causes 
the state to interfere with its intrinsic authority as its background, which, 
on the other hand, the local community to launch upon a series of behind-
the-scene maneuvers in an effort to allure as generous subsidies as possible. 
Of course, it cannot be denied that granting of such state subsidies are 
accompanied, to a certain extent, with national importance and significance. 
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It may, thus, be said that the state is obliged to defray them, while the 
local governments are entitled to receive them. This, especially, applies in 
cases where the state has commissioned some administrative matters for the 
local government to take care of. It is a fact, however, that a subsidy 
does not necessarily constitute a revenue coming from a local government 
but it does come from what the state has levied from all over the country. 
A subsidy is given by the state spurred by a general consideration and, 
from this, it is evident that a local government, as far as it is concerned, 
is totally dependent upon the state, and thus, the former is incapacitated 
to enjoy its own independence. Of course, in some cases, the local govern-
ment may take the lead in making decisions about a grant, because such, 
as a matter of principle, is given out to meet local requirements. In such 
cases, again, the local community has first to apply to the state for such 
subsidy, which, before being decided upon, has to be approved by the state. 
Decision, of course, is made by the states will, and, as far as this is concerned, 
the local community is entirely dependent upon the state, while, on the other 
hand, it would be too much to say that the local government is intrinsically 
entitled to receive it. There can be no autonomy of the local community 
in this connection, it being induced to become subservient to the state, to 
which it may have to direct its offensive of maneuvering. In this, other 
evils will naturally accompany. It is desirous, therefore, that the grant of 
a subsidy be accompanied with as little maneuvering eampaign as possible, 
and, in turn, that the local government be dependent upon the state as 
little as possibie. Regarding such evils as mentioned above, the 1954 an-
nual report compiled by the Board of Audit makes a clear-cut statement. 
First of all, the report cites the fact that, in an effort to squeeze as bountiful 
subsidies as possible from the state as well as for other purposes, the local 
governments at present are deeply imbued with the tendency for placing 
the first emphasis upon their own system of petitioning aimed at the central 
government. Every local government literally compete in setting up its 
respective branch offices in Tokyo, where a certain number of resident 
officials are stationed. Bribes are advanced to the members of the Diet as 
well as government officials. The money thus expended actually constitutes 
a big item among the expenditures defrayed by the local community for 
unnecessary purposes. Secondly, it often occurs that, in petitioning the cen-
tral government, the local community is liable to exaggerate the importance 
of an enterprise for which a subsidy is solicited. In actually spending the 
money thus gained, a tendency is often unavoidable that the need of eco-
nomy is relegated to the background. The situation is made worse as en-
gineering ability is often lacking. In spite of the inevitability that a portion 
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of the cost involved in the execution of an enterprise has to be shouldered 
by the local government, the latter lacks such financial capability as to 
shoulder the burden. This, unavoidably, entails such eventuality that the 
work, once started, refuses to show progress as scheduled. Settlement of 
accounts, after the work has been finished, are often conducted on the basis 
of expenses exceeding the expenditure actually needed for it. Sometimes, 
an existing establishment is pulled down simply for the purpose of using 
the money granted for the construction of a new one, though the the one 
now in existence is amply sufficient for the purpose for which it was origi-
nally set up. In other cases, again, application for one item of project is 
made separately to more than one government office. This means that 
money is being squandered for no purposes or that the money involved is 
unduly large in amount, which in ,other words, implies that unnecessary 
expenditures are incurred upon both the state and local government. Thir-
dly, the report advises that the state, in this connection, should exercise its 
authority of supervision. As a matter of fact, however, such supervision 
is not being exercised fully and properly, because, for one thing, the state, 
on its side, has to face so many applications, and, naturally, is not in a 
position to actually investigate one by one. Investigation, as far as the fact 
stands, is conducted by letter. This formula, in practice, sometimes induces 
the state to become unduly generous, while this generosity often comes out 
of a consideration of certain behind-the-scene personal connections. Consola-
tion, of course, will be found if the project is carried out precisely accor-
ding to the design for which the subsidy has been granted. Even when 
such is not the case, official confirmation is often given out that the project 
has been executed just in accordance with the conditions of subsidizing. 
With regard to an engineering work being projected, relief may be in that 
a written confirmation of completion is in need, and, therefore, there natu-
rally is a limit to an unauthentic statement. In the case of a subsidy, 
being granted for running administrative matters, there can be no question 
of a written confirmation being prepared to appraise the extent to which 
the work has witnessed progress. A report submitted by the local govern-
ment in question regarding the progress of the work will, thus, be approved 
for settlement without even investigating it on the spot. When things come 
to the extreme, it sometimes happens that the difference found between 
the money defrayed by the state treasury and that reported to have been 
received by the enterprise organization in question is overlooked without 
being checked beforehand. In appraising the cost of a project, work may 
be advanced with an optimistic mood as a settlement will eventually be 
made sooner or later, and, in the face of a failure in the progress of work, 
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it would be found to be highly difficult to decide on who actually has to 
shoulder the responsibility for such. Delay in submitting a report on the 
completion of work as well as about the settlement of accounts is frequent, 
which, in its turn, causes a delay in making a certificate of completion by 
a state minister in charge available. Sometimes the delay may extend over 
a period of three or four years. In the interval, natural disaster may occur 
to the extent that there is no confirming whether the work has really been 
completed nor deciding on where the responsibility involved will have to 
be placed. This may be too much of an inside story; such irregularities 
as are alluded to in the preceding lines do not, of course, apply to all cases. 
It may, however, be safe to say that, even though such happens in excep-
tional cases only, subsidies, which are liable to deprive the local government 
of its independence, are often accompanied with a tendency to give birth 
to such. This naturally leads to the conclusion that the grant of subsidies 
should be mitigated in number as much as possible, and confined, in excep-
tional cases, to the following: I) Fresh or exceedingly special project, 2) 
Large-scale construction or repair work, 3) Reconstruction work after a 
natural disaster, and 4) Such work as is commissioned by the state. 
(6) Local Autonomy in Public Bonds 
An influential local community backed by its own credit, is in a POSI-
tion to freely avail itself of public bonds. However, in actual practice, it 
is subject to the control consequential to the national policy in general, 
regarding finance,. economy and industry. To the extent that such state 
policy is not directly affected, the local community, without aid from the 
state, may make good of public bonds autonomously. At the present mo-
ment, the local government in Japan "is subject to various control and limi-
tations imposed by the state. In spite of this, however, some of influential 
communities may utilize public bonds more or less independently of state 
intervention. The fact is, however, that many of the financially-weak local 
governments are naturally not only subject to state control but actually are 
in a position to look for state help. Remedy of this situation in future may, 
perhaps, be found in the setting up of a communal organization, which local 
governments may be allowed to utilize with an aim to lessening state help 
as much as possible. Further, in order to promote the local autonomy in 
regard to public bonds, the conditions for issuing such bonds will advanta-
geously be made much simpler (for instance, the conditions will had better 
be confined to the maintenance of a certain fixed ratio between the amount 
to be issued in bonds and the capacity of redeeming them) as well as the 
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procedures of issuing involved be rendered less complicated then they actually 
are now. 
(7) Fundamentals for Independence of Local Finance 
While it goes without saying that the independence of local finance is 
a matter of utmost importance, and, as such, has to be promoted as much 
as possible, it may be desired that measures be taken to lessen the amount 
of work commissioned to the local communities by_ the state and the subsi-
dies involved, to make simpler the conditions and procedures relative to the 
issuance of public bonds, and, to implement the local taxes, particularly 
independent taxes. What is more -fundamental and essential, however, is 
an improvement in the attitude on the part of local officials in charge of 
disposal of financial matters. Such will weigh much also in the proposed 
improvement of the situation now prevailing in local finance, where deficit 
has invariably come up to the fore. The most important thing, in this 
connection, is the observance of a clear-cut responsibility, execution of their 
respective obligations on the part of local governments, in strict obeyance of 
state directions, and the least possible dependence upon state help. Deficit 
should scrupulously be guarded aginst; the principle should be set up that 
local revenue is formulated in the light of expenditures as well as that 
expenditures be measured according to the amount of revenue expectable. 
Balance of revenue and expenditures alone should be considered not enough; 
disappearance of deficit should be followed by the appearance of a surplus. 
A surplus, if ever realized, should be put aside for future use. Economy 
should be the first consideration in expenditures, while the capability of the 
citizens in general to shoulder the burden should first be taken up in con-
nection with assessing the revenue, especially, the taxes to be levied. Ex-
penditures shuld be such that the revenue, thus assessed, can sufficiently 
meet. Reticence, as far as feasible, should be excercised in contemplating 
issuance of public bonds. Least depepdence upon state subsidy should be 
aimed at. Most essential of all, petitioning ,for subsidy should rather be 
considered as a disgrace, and, thus, should serve as a warning to the officials 
of local government. Only when all these have been accomplished, will 
the independence of local finance be firmly set up. The present state of 
things in Japan, in this connection, leaves much to be desired, indeed. At 
the same time that a cry is high for the promotion and extension of local 
autonomy, virtually endless queues of' petitioners are finding their way to 
Tokyo. How to dispose of this contradiction, in an effective way; poses 
now a superlative problem to be solved. 
